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APPLICATION OF FEDERAL WAGE AND HOUR
STANDARDS TO STATE EMPLOYEES
National League of Cities v. Usery'
The 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act 2 extended the
coverage of the federal minimum wage and maximum hour law3 to include
nearly all public employees of the states and their political subdivisions,
4
The National League of Cities, and individual cities and states, 5 brought an
action in the District Court for the District of Columbia to challenge the
validity of the 1974 amendments as they apply to state and local govern-
ments as employers. 6 Their contention was that federal wage and hour
regulation applied directly to the states is prohibited by principles of
federalism inherent in the Constitution. It was asserted that the sovereign
states, in contrast to a private individual, have a unique position in the
federal system. In order to maintain that position, the states require an
immunity from federal regulation under the commerce power, when the
exercise of that power threatens state sovereignty. The district court consid-
ered these contentions "substantial," but found for the Secretary of Labor
and denied injunctive and declaratory relief.7
The Supreme Court reversed the district court by a 5-4 vote. The 1974
amendments were held to be unconstitutional insofar as their direct applica-
1. 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
2. Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55, amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 207 (Supp. V,
1975) amending 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 207 (1970).
3. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.
(1970).
4. Prior to 1974, the only public employees covered by the Fair Labor
Standards Act were non-professional employees of public hospitals, schools, or
institutions.
5. Appellants include the National Governors' Conference; the States of
Arizona, California, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Washington; the Metropolitan Government of
Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn.; and the cities of Cape Girardeau, Mo.,
Lompac, Cal., and Salt Lake City, Utah.
6. National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826 (D.D.C. 1974).
7. The district court based its decision on the precedent of Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183 (1968), but noted:
We are troubled by these [Petitioners' contentions] and consider that they
are substantial and that it may well be that the Supreme Court will feel it
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tion to the states would operate to interfere with independent state
decision-making concerning "integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions." The Court found that the federalism limitation on
the grant of power to Congress in the commerce clause precludes direct
federal control of a state's wage and hour policy towards its own employees.
The power to regulate interstate commerce is one of Congress' constitu-
tionally enumerated powers. 8 Based on an initial broad interpretation of the
commerce clause, 9 the Court has found the commerce power to be one of the
most expansive possessed by the Congress. Two theories have been used by
the Court to justify Congressional regulation under the commerce power.
The first, based on the power to control interstate transportation, provides
that Congress can regulate anything that moves in interstate commerce, 10
even if non-commercial in nature. The "movement" theory has been used to
justify the exercise of a broad national police power." The second theory
requires the commerce clause to be read in conjunction with the necessary
and proper clause 12 and permits Congress to regulate those activities that
affect interstate commerce. Thus, the scope of Congress' power extends to
intrastate activities' 3 provided there is a "close and substantial" relationship
to interstate commerce.14 The Court has indicated that if an activity has an
effect on interstate commerce, that activity is subject to federal regulation,
notwithstanding the insignificance of any specific instance of the activity.' 5
Therefore, Congress has been held to have the power to reach almost any
economic activity.
In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act, prohibiting
interstate transportation of goods produced under substandard labor condi-
tions. The Act included provisions for a minimum wage, 16 for maximum
hours and overtime payments, 17 and for the prohibition of "oppressive child
labor."'" In United States v. Darby, a unanimous Court held the Act to be a
legitimate exercise of the commerce power.19 Substandard labor conditions
had an adverse effect on interstate commerce and regulations to eliminate
such conditions were within the broad scope of Congressional authority
established in previous "commerce clause" cases. The Act as originally
passed was limited in its coverage. Excluded were workers not actually
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3. "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
9. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
10. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
11. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. "To make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers. .. ."
13. Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
14. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
15. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970).
17. Id. § 207.
18. Id. § 212.
19. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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engaged in production or transportation of goods,20 as well as administrative
and executive employees.2 1 Public employees also were excluded because
the states and their political subdivisions were specifically excluded from the
Act's definition of "employer."
22
The Act has been amended several times with the effect of increasing
the number of protected employees.23 Public employees were first brought
under the Act in 1966. The definition of "employer" was amended to
include a state or a political subdivision thereof with respect to employees of
a public hospital, institution, or school.2 4 This extension was approved in
Maryland v. Wirtz.25 The institutions involved were found to be within the
reach of the commerce power, and the fact that they were owned and
operated by a state or municipal government was held not to restrain
Congressional regulation. The question of a "state sovereignty" limitation
on the commerce power was dismissed, applying United States v. California8
where the Federal Safety Appliance Act was enforced against a state-
operated railroad. The Court in Wirtz said that if a state engaged in an
activity validly regulated when performed by private persons, federal regu-
lation of that activity was no less valid because a state was involved.27 The
question considered in Wirtz was whether Congress had a "rational basis" to
consider the Act necessary for the regulation of interstate commerce. Once
the "rational basis" had been identified, the Court said its work was finished,
notwithstanding the application of this "commerce clause" case directly to
the states. In a strong dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas considered that "constitu-
tional principles of federalism" imposed a limit on the federal commerce
power concerning activities of the states. He drew an analogy between the
"federalism" limitation on the commerce power and the limit placed on the
federal power to tax the states by the doctrine of intergovernmental
immunity. Both of these limitations arise from the protection of state
sovereignty afforded by the Constitution.28
The 1974 amendments29 removed the exemption previously afforded
20. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 3(j), 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 203(j) (1949)).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1970).
22. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1949)).
23. E.g., Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, 75
Stat. 65, amending29 U.S.C. §§ 203,206, 207 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(r), 203(s),
206(b), 207(a)(2) (1964 ed.)). The "enterprise" concept extended coverage to every
employee of an "enterprise engaged in commerce," even though the individual
employee was not personally involved in the production or transportation of goods.
24. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat.
830, amending 29 U.S.C. § 203 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), 203(r), 203(s) (1970)).
25. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
26. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
27. 392 U.S. at 197.
28. Id. at 204 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
29. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat.
55, amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 207.
[Vol. 42
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the states and extended coverage to nearly all public employees.5 0 Activities
of public agencies were defined to be those of an "enterprise engaged in
commerce,"31 which brought all employees of public agencies within the
scope of the Act. The exclusion of administrative, executive, and profes-
sional employees was retained,3 2 and some new exceptions adopted to meet
the special job situations of some public employees. 3
Appellants in National League of Cities did not contend that wage and
hour regulation touching state employees was beyond the scope of the
federal commerce power, rather that the exercise of that power is limited by
constitutional principles of federalism. In dealing with this proposition, the
Court did not treat National League of Cities as one in the long line of cases
dealing with the "breadth of authority granted Congress with the commerce
powers." The attention of the Court was not concerned with "breadth of
authority," but with the identification of an affirmative limitation on the
exercise of that broad authority. It has been recognized since Gibbons v.
Ogden that the Constitution places limits on Congress' commerce power.
The Court in National League of Cities offered examples of those limitations
in the guarantees of the Bill of Rights: the right to trial by jury34 and the right
to due process of law.3 5 The Court's decision did not narrow the scope of the
commerce power, as suggested by Mr. Justice Brennan in his dissent.36 The
Court found, rather, that there is an implicit "federalism" limitation on
Congress' commerce power, operating in like fashion as the express Bill of
Rights limitations.
The Court grounded this limitation on the essential role of the states in
the federal system. The federal union is composed of "indestructible"
component parts37 whose existence is guaranteed in the Constitution.38 The
limitation was not found in the Tenth Amendment, as has often been
argued 9.3 The Court did, however, offer the Tenth Amendment as an
"express declaration" of what the limitation means: "that Congress may not
exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to
function in a federal system."40 The protection of the states' ability to
30. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (Supp. V, 1975). The definition of "employer" was
amended to specifically include public agencies.
31. Id. § 203(s)(5).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1970).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(C)(ii) (Supp. V, 1975). Public elective office holders
and certain staff members were excepted. 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) (Supp. V, 1975). There
were special maximum hours ahd overtime provisions for employees in fire and
police services.
34. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
35. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
36. National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465,2482 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
37. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869).
38. See D. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 40
(1966).
39. E.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
40. 96 S. Ct. at 2470, quotingfrom Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,547 (1975).
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function provided by the "federalism" limitation on the commerce power
was linked by the Court to the implied limitation on another power dele-
gated to Congress, that of taxation. The Court quoted from New York v.
United States4 to illustrate, by analogy with the doctrine of intergovernmen-
tal immunity from taxation, the proposition that the standing of a sovereign
state is quite different from that of a private individual. In reply to Mr.
Justice Brennan's dissent that New York was concerned not with a state
s6vereignty limitation on the commerce power but with the principle of
implied intergovernmental immunity, the Court stated that, "the asserted
distinction. . . escapes us." Although not expressly stated, it is evident that
the limitation on the commerce power arises from the same principles of
constitutional federalism as the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immu-
nity.42 Congress has the authority to tax the income of a private person, but
not the revenues of a sovereign state. The Court held that there is a similar
limitation on the exercise of the commerce power. There are some elements
of state sovereignty which may not be impaired by Congress, even through
the exercise of the plenary power to regulate commerce. The task of the
Court was to decide whether state determinations of wage and hour policies
for public employees were "functions essential to separate and independent
existence," and thus protected from federal interference.
The power to make wage and hour decisions concerning a state's own
employees is an "undoubted" attribute of sovereignty. Appellants argued
that restrictions placed on the states' freedom of action in this area would
have a serious impact on the position of the states within the federal system.
The Court found that the 1974 amendments interfered with the "integral
governmental functions" of state and local governments to an impermissible
degree. State and local governments would be compelled to bear increased
costs. Local governments, with state constitutional limitations on tax
increases and prohibitions against deficit financing, might be forced into an
impossible position.43 This fiscal squeeze would cause the curtailment of
some services. The Court also found that the Act as amended would force
the restructuring of many of the traditional methods that state and local
governments have chosen to deliver services and enforce the law. Of special
concern was the effect that the minimum wage provisions would have on the
utilization of volunteer services, and the effect the overtime provisions
would have on such services as police and fire protection. Although there
was some question as to the actual magnitude of the impact of federal
regulation, the Court found it "significant" in such areas as fire prevention,
police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation.44 The
ability of the states to maintain their position in the federal system was based
on the freedom to independently organize these "integral operations in
41. 326 U.S. 572, 587 (1946).
42. National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465,2470 (1976); Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 204 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
43. Brief for Appellants at 33.
44. 96 S. Ct. at 2474.
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areas of traditional governmental functions." Insofar as the 1974 amend-
ments impaired that freedom, they were disapproved.
The Court then dealt with precedent, Fry v. United States45 and Wirtz, of
prior approval of direct federal regulation of the same employment rela-
tionships protected in National League of Cities. Fry was distinguished. The
intrusion of the Economic Stabilization Act on the states' freedom to
structure wage and hour policies was characterized as a temporary
emergency measure limited to a specific time period.46 The wage freeze
locked in state-structured wage scales rather than compelling a restructure.
Pressure on state budgets was reduced rather than increased. Wirtz, on the
other hand, was overruled. Dicta from United States v. California,47 relied on
in Wirtz and equating the regulation of state activities under the commerce
power with regulation of the activities of private individuals, was pronounced
"1simply wrong." The Court's reasoning in NationalLeague of Citieswas based
on the proposition that the position of a State is quite different from that of a
private individual. The schools and hospitals at issue in Wirtz were also
found to be within the category of "traditional government functions"
circumscribed by this ruling.
48
The Court has held that the states are not immune from all federal
regulation under the authority granted in the commerce clause. 49 This
means that a line must be drawn somewhere. It had been previously
suggested that opposing categories of "governmental" and "proprietary"
activities or "traditional" and "non-traditional" activities might be used to
help draw that line.5 ° The majority in National League of Cities drew the line
at "integral operations" in areas of traditional governmental activity. Em-
ployer-employee relations in areas of state activities such as police and fire
protection services, sanitation, public health, hospitals, and schools are
clearly on the protected side of the line; the operation of a state-owned
railroad, as in United States v. California, clearly is not.51 Further clarification
of the "integral function" of state and local governments remains for the
courts.
National League of Citieswill have an effect on federal regulation in areas
of public sector labor relations other than wage and hour policies. Applica-
45. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
46. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-28, § 8,27
Stat. 27 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (Supp. III, 1973)). The authority contained in
the Act to impose mandatory wage controls expired April 30, 1974.
47. 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936).
48. 96 S. Ct. at 2476. The holding in California was distinguished in that the
operation of a railroad was found not to be an integral function in an area of
traditional governmental activity.
49. E.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
50. Id. at 558, n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Contra, United States v. Califor-
nia, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936).
51. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); United States v. California,
297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936).
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tion of federal pension regulations 52 to now-exempt government retirement
plans for public employees53 may violate the federalism limitation. Govern-
ment pensions can be considered a significant part of the compensation
package offered to state employees, including those engaged in the "inte-
gral operations" of government. It is arguable that the structuring of a
pension plan is a "fundamental employment decision." If so, state govern-
ment retirement plans are within the protected area. The same argument
might urge the invalidity of future legislation compelling state and public
employee participation in programs under the Social Security Act.5 4 It is
possible that compulsory Social Security coverage for state employees would
be a more serious violation since the Act fixes the amounts and terms of the
employer's contribution, removing those decisions from state policy-
making bodies. On the other hand, it also could be argued that pension plans
and disability and old age insurance coverage constitute a very minor part of
the labor contract and certainly are not as basic to state employment policy as
are wages and hours. Perhaps of greater significance, the decision in
National League of Cities could stifle proposals for federal legislation requir-
ing the states to engage in compulsory collective bargaining with labor
unions representing public employees.5 5 The Court struck down the 1974
amendments because their application would "significantly alter or displace
the States' abilities to structure employer-employee relationships." Argu-
ments against compulsory public sector collective bargaining 6 make a
strong case for intervention of the federalism limitation as a bar to any such
legislation. Usurpation of the legislative function of state government in the
area of employer-employee relations by federally required collective bar-
gaining could be considered to be most damaging to state sovereignty and
therefore constitutionally prohibited.
In striking down the 1974 amendments, the Court expressed no view as
to the result if Congress sought to affect "integral operations" of state
governments under constitutional authority other than the commerce
clause. 7 It is not unlikely that, subject to the same political pressures that
brought about the 1974 amendments, Congress will attempt to do indirectly
what it could not do directly. In exercise of the spending power, Congress
might condition the receipt of federal revenue sharing funds on state
compliance with minimum wage and hour standards. As the spending
power is limited in scope only by "the general welfare," it may be broader
52. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,29 U.S.C. § 1001 et
seq. (Supp. V, 1975).
53. Id. §§ 1003(b)(1), 1321(b)(2).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(7) (1970).
55. H.R. 77, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 8677, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
56. See Petro, Sovereignty and Compulsory Public Sector Bargaining, 10 WAKE
FoREsT L. REv. 25 (1974).
57. 96 S. Ct. at 2474 n.17.
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